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In the Supreme Court of the State of Utah
CASE NO. 10398
ST. GEORGE CITY, a municipal corporation,
Plaintiff,
-vsMILL CREEK WATER COMPANY, a corporation, ISRAEL NIELSON, STEVEN
E. KIRKLAND, MARION JOLLY, MELVIN ADAMS, JOHN AVERITT, and
JOSEPH BARLOW,
Defendants,
W.cl.SHINGTON CITY, a municipal corporation, ROAD RUNNER INN, a corporation. and DARRELL G. HAFEN,
Intervening Defendants,
CIVIL No. 2508
~-··

CREEK WATER COMPANY,
Plaintiff,
-vsrSRAEL NIELSON and CADDIE NIELSON, GLEN TOBLER and BEATRICE
TOBLER, THE CITY OF WASHINGTON, a municipal corporation, and NORMA
WALKER,
Defendants,
ROAD RUNNER INN, a corporation, and DARRELL G. HAFEN,
Intervening Defendants,
CIVIL No. 2940
MELVIN ADAMS, MARION JOLLEY, STEVEN E. KIRKLAND and WASHPlaintiffs,
INGTON CITY CORPORATION,
-vs.MILL CREEK WATER COMPANY, a corporation, ST. GEORGE CITY, and
the STATE ENGINEER OF UTAH,
Defendants.
WASHINGTON CITY CORPORATION,
Plaintiff,
-vs.MILL CREEK WATER COMPANY, a corporation, MELVIN ADAMS, ST.
GEORGE CITY, STEVEN E. KIRKLAND, MARION JOLLEY and the STATE
Defendants.
ENGINEER OF UTAH,
M1\RION JOLLEY, MELVIN ADAMS, STEVEN E. KIRKLAND,
Plaintiffs,
-vsWASHINGTON CITY CORPORATION,
Defendant,
ROAD RUNNER INN, a corporation, and DARRELL G. HAFEN,
Intervening Defendants.
CIVIL No. 3036
~JILL

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS

STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE
Appellants' statement of the nature of the three cases
involved in this appeal and the reason for consolidation is
inaccnrate and misleading in several particulars. It does,
howncr, set forth that No. 2508 is a condemnation action
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brought by St. George City to condemn 2.57 c.f.s. of the
waters of Mill Creek, otherwise referred to as Sand Hollow
Creek; that No. 2940 is a condemnation action in which
Mill Creek Water Company sought to condemn an easement for a ditch; and that No. 3036 is a petition brought by
appellants to review a series of decisions of the State Enai.
b
neer on applications to appropriate or applications to
change points of diversion, affecting the waters of Mill
Creek, otherwise known as Sand Hollow Creek.
The reason for and extent of consolidation of such diverse
actions is not sufficiently explained, however, and respondents believe that the court will have less difficulty with the
mass of material presented by the appellants' brief if it is
pointed out that the consolidation of the three cases was not
for all purposes, but rather to get a ruling from the court
upon the contention raised by the appellants in each case
that the present Mill Creek Water Company did not sue·
ceed to ownership of water rights in Mill Creek decreed to
the old Mill Creek Water Company. Since appellants in·
jected this issue into each of the three cases, and since it
appeared to be desirable to have the point disposed of be·
fore trial of the issue of damages in the condemnation suits,
the respondents consented to consolidation for the purpw
of having the court rule upon that question. It should br
noted that the court did not, in its summary judgment, rule
upon issues of damages, but did rule that the new l\Iill
Creek Water Company succeeded to the rights decreed to
the old Mill Creek Water Company in the waters of :Mill
Creek, and that the appellants' motions for summary judg·
ments in their favor should be denied. Appellants assert
at page 3 of their brief that the summary judgment ~ia'.
entered on motion of respondents - whereas the finding)
and iud,gment show that it was a denial of motions of
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Adams et al. and Washington City for summary judgments
in their favor. ( R. 90-100.)
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Statement of Facts in appellants' brief is incomplete
and erroneous in several particulars, and for the purpose of
clarification and correction, these respondents submit the
following:
In 1956 or 1957, St. George City officials found that the
city had an inadequate water supply for present and future
domestic and municipal needs, and decided that it would be
desirable to acquire the waters of Mill Creek, otherwise
known as Sand Hollow Creek, a small stream which has
its source on the south slope of Pine Valley Mountains, and
which waters were being used for irrigation of farmsexcept for 0.68 c.f .s. being used by Washington City for city
lot irrigation. The remaining portion of the stream, viz.,
2.57 c.f.s., had been decreed to Mill Creek Water Company
by Virgin River General Adjudication Decree in the year
1923, and had been distributed by such company to its
stockholders for irrigation of approximately 141.5 acres of
land.
St. George City negotiated with stockholders of Mill
Creek Water Company for purchase of their shares in the
company, and reached agreement with a majority of such
stockholdns and purchased 123Y2 shares of a total of 195
shares, hut '"'as unable to purchase the shares registered
in the books of the company in the names of the appellants
I'llelvin Adams, Marion Jolley and Steven Kirkland. The
City then in April, 1957, instituted Civil Action No. 2508
in the District Court for condemnation of their rights.
Adams, Jolley, Kirkland and Mill Creek Water Company
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were named as defendants in this action. An order for
temporary possession was granted May 20, 1957. The
appellant Darrell G. Hafen then came on the scene and
intervened in the action, claiming that he had a contract
for purchase of the rights of Adams, Jolley and Kirkland;
also, the rights of one Israel Nielson who had been drawing
his portion of Mill Creek Company water from Green
Spring, which was not sought to be condemned by St.
George City. Washington City also intervened in the condemnation suit, claiming that it had need of the Mill Creek
water and that St. George City could not condemn waters
of a stream adjacent to Washington City which might be
needed for its future growth.
On January 28, 1958, Washington City filed with the
State Engineer its application No. 29676 to appropriate
3.00 c.f.s. of water from Sand Hollow Creek for domestic
and municipal use. (R. 95, Ex. 2.) This application was
rejected by the State Engineer April 6, 1962, which rejec·
tion is one of the decisions of the State Engineer involved in
Civil Action No. 3036.
On August 7, 1961, Mill Creek Water Company filed
Civil Action No. 2940, in which it sought to condemn a
right of way for a ditch to convey a portion of the Mill
Creek waters to supply some of its stockholders. The right
of way extended across a platted street of Washington City
and certain private land of other owners not here involved.
Washington City contested this action and raised the issue
that the plaintiff was not the owner of waters of Mill Creek
and was not the legal successor of the old Mill Creek Water
Company whose charter expired in 1953.
On July 7, 1961, Mill Creek Water Company filed with
the State Engineer its application No. a-3970 (R. 96, Ex. 6)
for permanent change of point of diversion of 2.5 7 c.f.s. of
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the waters of Sand Hollow Creek. This application was
protested by appellants herein, and was approved April 6,
1962 over their protest. On October 2, 1961, the appellants Adams, Jolley and Kirkland filed with the State Engineer their application No. a-4017, asking for permanent
change of point of diversion of 2.5 7 c.f.s. of water from Sand
Hollow (R. 96--97, Ex. 7). This application was rejected
April 6, 1962. On June 5, 1962, the appellants herein filed
their action Civil No. 3036, in which they petitioned the
District Court to review and reverse the action of the State
Engineer in rejecting Washington City's application to
appropriate No. 29676 and the application of Adams, Jolley
and Kirkland to change point of diversion of 2.57 c.f.s. of
waters of Sand Hollow; also, to reverse the order of the
State Engineer in approving the application of Mill Creek
Water Company No. a-3970 to change point of diversion.
They also, for some unknown reason, prayed for review of
the action of the State Engineer in approving two change
applications filed by Washington City for change of points
of diversion of 0.35 c.f.s. and 0.03 c.f.s. of water decreed to
Washington City.
After the institution of Civil No. 3036, several pre-trial
conferences were had and proposals made for stipulation of
facts, but without agreement being reached except as to
certain documentary exhibits and certain other minor matten. The appellants then filed motions for summary judgment in their favor in each of the three cases. St. George
City and Mill Creek Water Company then made demand
upon appellants for answers to interrogatories. After incomplete and indefinite answers were made, respondents
made demand for more specific answers, which demand
has not been complied with.
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On or about April 29, 1963, the court entered its order
denying appellants' motions for summary judgments. Appellants then moved for new trial. In August, 1964, the
court denied this motion and filed a memorandum decision
setting out grounds for the decision. Thereafter, in May,
1965, the court signed and filed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Summary Judgment. In these the court
found and adjudged that the new Mill Creek Water Company had succeeded to the rights of the old Mill Creek
Water Company in 2.57 c.f.s. of the waters of Mill Creek
decreed to the old company, and that it was a proper party
defendant in the condemnation case Civil No. 2508; also,
that it was a proper party to make application No. a-3970
for change of point of diversion of said 2.57 c.f.s. of Mill
Creek water and that the State Engineer properly granted
the application. The court also found that St. George City
had acquired by purchase 106 shares (subsequently increased to 12 3 y2 shares) of stock of the new Mill Creek
\\Tater Company out of 195 shares outstanding, and by
virtue of such purchase was then entitled to 106/195 of the
waters of Sand Hollow Creek (Mill Creek). No findings
were made by the court on the issue of damages in the con·
demnation cases. The appellants have taken this appeal
from the summary judgment mentioned.
The Statement of Facts set forth in appellants' brief is
erroneous and misleading in the following particulars:
1. The statement made in paragraph 1 that all of the
assets of the Mill Creek Water Company were ovmcd and
controlled by the stockholders is misleading, since the rec·
ord shows that the Virgin River Decree (Ex. 1) awarded
2.57 c.f.s. of the water of Sand Hollow Creek to Mill Creek
Water Company for use on lands owned by its stockholders.
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::!. In paragraph 8, appellants infer that the court received no evidence upon which to base the finding therein
referred to. Respondents submit that such finding is supported by admissions of appellants and by their answers to
interrogatories propounded to them by these respondents.
Respondents further submit that appellants have failed to
bring before this court the entire record made in the trial
court, and in particular have failed to bring up the interrogatories and answers. The appellants are therefore not
in a position to question the findings of fact of the trial
court. This applies also to paragraph 11 of the statement
of appellants.

3. The concluding statement of appellants' paragraph
14 to the effect that St. George City has at all times had
possession of all the waters of Sand Hollow to the exclusion
of appellants is not supported by the evidence and is contrary to the facts and the answers of appellants to the interrogatories referred to.
4. Paragraph 24 of the appellants' statement is erroneous
in stating that St. George City filed civil action No. 2940
in the name of Mill Creek Water Company. St. George City
mrns a majority of stock of Mill Creek Water Company,
but the action was brought by the company.
5. Paragraph 28 is erroneous in asserting that Washington City has been deprived by St. George City of water to
11 hich it is entitled under the Virgin River Decree. Respondents assert that Washington City has received at all
times all water from Mill Creek to which it was entitled,
and that there is no proof to the contrary.
6. Paragraph 35 is not consistent with the record, and is
contrary to paragraph 6 of the summary judgment involved
in this appeal (R.100).
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7. Paragraph 36 is contrary to the facts and has no support in the record.
ARGUMENT
Before proceeding to discuss appellants' contentions as to
the effect of the lapsing of the charter period of existence
of the original Mill Creek Water Company, or to raise the
issue of whether the new company did or did not succeed
to ownership of water rights decreed to the original company, these respondents submit:
(a) That the State Engineer was not the proper officer
to adjudicate such a question, and that the court in a proceeding for plenary review of the State Engineer's decision
should not adjudicate an issue which could not properly be
presented before the State Engineer - especially where,
as here, the State Engineer declined to adjudicate the question of title. (See State Engineer's decision on Application
a-3970 (R. 96, Ex. 6.) ) .
(b) That in the condemnation cases, 2508 and 2940,
none of the appellants is in a position to raise the issue of
. title of the new Mill Creek Water Company. Each of the
appellants has been made a party defendant in Civil No.
2508. It is incumbent upon each of the defendants ( including the intervening defendants) to prove his or its title and
his or its damages. Whether the appellants Adams, Jolley
and Kirkland, or the interveners Hafen and Road Runner
Inn (who claim to have acquired the rights of Adams.
Jolley and Kirkland) claim ownership of rights in Sand
Hollow Creek as stockholders in the new corporation which
they (or their predecessors in interest) assisted in organiz·
ing, or whether they claim by reason of having been stockholders in the old company when its charter lapsed, their
rights are the same. Their stock ownership in the new com-
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pany is in the same identical proportion as they and/or
their predecessors had in the old company. When the charter of the old company expired, the rights of the stockholders continued in the same proportion as before in the assets
of the company. And when the new company was organized by them, they were entitled to stock in the same
proportions as in the old company. This was according to
the law and was given effect in the articles of incorporation adopted by the new company (Ex. 9). The appellants
are not only estoppcd to claim anything additional to the
stock accepted by them or their predecessors in the new
corporation, but they should also be denied the privilege
of attacking in this collateral proceeding the rights of the
Mill Creek Water Company or the rights of St. George
City under its stock ownership in the Mill Creek Water
Company. If they have any claim against the Mill Creek
Water Company, they should try such claim in a direct proceeding and not in an action to review a decision or decisions of the State Engineer or in a condemnation suit where
they have been made party defendants and are given the
right and duty to appear and prove their ownership of
interests in the property sought to be taken by eminent
domain. The jurisdiction of the court in the condemnation actions did not depend upon whether the new Mill
Creek Water Company had succeeded to the rights of the
old company. It had jurisdiction to entertain a suit against
A clams, Jolley, Kirkland, Hafen, Road Runner Inn, and
Washington City- without regard to whether another
party. J\Jill Creek Water Company, also had an interest in
the property or a claim to damages for the taking of prop~rt \ belonging to it. In any condemnation proceeding, it
is not a matter of defense or a matter in bar of the action
for a person who is made a party defendant to plead that
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there are other persons who should be made parties or that
persons have been named as parties who have no interest in
the property. Brigham City v. Chase, 30 Utah 410, 85 Pac.
436. Each party who is made a defendant is charged with
the duty of proving his ownership of an interest in the property sought to be taken and the extent of his damages.
Tanner v. Provo Bench Canal Co., 40 Utah 105, 121 Pac.
584, 589; 18 Am. Jur. 985, Sec. 342; 65 A.L.R. 440, 446.
( c) In Civil No. 2940, in which Mill Creek Water Company seeks to condemn an easement for a ditch, it is immaterial whether Mill Creek Water Company is the owner of
the waters of Sand Hollow Creek or is only a distributing
company organized by the stockholders of the old company
to distribute the waters to which they may have been entitled when charter of the old company expired. A water
distributing company is entitled to condemn easements for
ditches for convenient distribution of waters used by its
stockholders. Sec. 73-1-6, U.C.A. 1953.
( d) Relative to the attempt of the appellants to claim
that part or all of the waters of Mill Creek became unappropriated waters after the expiration of the charter of
the old Mill Creek Water Company, it should be sufficient
answer to such a contention to refer to the statute which
requires a period of five years to elapse before a forfeiture or
reversion to the public can be claimed. In this case, the
charter of the old company did not expire until February
20, 1953. Its directors and officers continued to act and to
distribute the waters of Mill Creek until the new company
was organized. Articles of incorporation of the new company were filed with the Secretary of State February 8,
1957. On May 20, 1957, St. George City was granted an
order of temporary possession. Appellants allege that it
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then took possession of the waters of Mill Creek and has
since ust>d such waters. The court found that between 1953
and 195 7, the waters were used by the stockholders of the
old company and their successors in interest in the same
proportions as the stock ownership in the old company. This
court cannot disturb this finding of the trial court where it
does not have before it the entire record made in the trial
court. It is obvious that there was no forfeiture or reversion
to the public. Also, it is obvious that none of the appellants
acquired any right by their attempt to appropriate or by
adverse use. Sec. 73--1--4 and Sec. 73-3-1, U.C.A. 1953,
which require five full years of continuous non-use to work
a forfeiture and which forbid acquisition of title to water
right by adverse use, prevented that. If one stockholder in
a mutual irrigation company or association used more than
his legal proportion of the waters owned or distributed by
the company or association, he does not thereby acquire a
right to the excess so used.
Referring now to appellants' argument under Point 1
of their brief, it is obvious that such point need not be
argued. It is rendered irrelevant by the very matters set
forth by the appellants themselves in Points 3 and 4 of their
brief and the quotations from cases and authorities there
given.
It is strange indeed that appellants would think that the
>tockholclers of the old company could not continue to use
the waters of "Mill Creek as they had done before lapse of
tlie charter, or that they could not, by unanimous action,
create a new corporation and clothe it with the same powers
1
' ·' tlw old companv. The court found that they did this very
thin_c'. Sef' Findings Nos. 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, R. 90.) And,
1
;k1t in forming the nl'w corporation, they named Marion
l• 1 llcv and Mclcin Adams as directors· also Israel Nielson
1.

'

'

'
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under whom Darrell Hafen and Road Runner Inn claim.
Also, that Joel C. Barlow, under whom Kirkland claims,
was one of the incorporators.
The court found:
"12. There is no contention or evidence that anyone was in any way damaged by the failure to amend
the Articles of Incorporation of the old company to
continue its corporate charter and term, or by the filing
of the Articles and the incorporation of the new company."
Appellants lay great stress upon their claim that the only
legal course of action open to the old Mill Creek Water
Company, after lapse of its charter, was to "wind up its
affairs." Why labor this point? Could there have been a
more appropriate or reasonable or sensible way to wind up
the affairs of this irrigation company than for the stockholders to re-organize the company or organize a new company with the same number of shares and the same proportions of stock ownership as existed in the old company?
Under Point 4, appellants argue that the protection
afforded stockholders of a water company against loss of
rights through non-use of their proper proportions of a
stream continues only during the corporate life of the corporation, and that upon lapse of the corporate charter "any
stockholder who ceased to use the same would lose his share
of such water rights, and the waters would become open to
appropriation by others through compliance with the applicable Utah statutes covering appropriation." Can appellants' counsel be unaware that the Utah statute governing appropriation, Sec. 73-1-4, U.C.A. 1953, requires five
years of continuous non-use before a water right reverts to
the public and becomes subject to a new appropriation?
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Or can counsel have failed to see that between February
20, 1953 and February 8, 1957, no five-year period had
elapsed? Or docs counsel assert that appellants could
have acquired any title by adverse use in disregard of Sec.
73-3-1, UC.A. 1953? Or that there is any evidence whatewr of any intentional abandonment of any of the waters
of Mill Creek? The court found otherwise, and this court
cannot, upon the record before it, disturb that finding.
Under Point 5 of their brief, appellants argue that the
new Mill Creek Water Company does not own rights in the
waters of Sand Hollow or Green Ditch (sic), since no
assignments or other valid transfer of such water rights
from the legal owners have been made to the new company.
They do not ref er to any evidence to support this assertion,
nor attempt to explain the effect of participation of Adams
and Jolley and the predecessors in interest of Kirkland,
Hafen and Road Runner Inn in the incorporation of the
new company, or their acceptance of stock in it, or the
acceptance by Adams and Jolley of positions as directors
of it Nor do they cite any authority for the position they
take under this heading. But, in any event it is immaterial
in the condemnation cases where the appellants were made
parties defendant and have the duty of proving their ownership of interests in the property sought to be condemned,
instead of asking that the cases be dismissed because of their
claim that another named defendant has no legal title to
the prnpertv. It is, likewise, immaterial in case No. 3036
involving appeal from the State Engineer, who did not have
im isdirtinn to try the question of title.
l 1nder Point 6 of their brief, appellants argue that the
new Mill Creek Water Company was not incorporated in
,,:rimpliance with Sec. 16--2-5 ( 9), U.C.A. 1953, which calls
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for designation of the number of directors required to form
a quorum. Such omission can obviously not invalidate the
act of incorporation, and appellants cite no authority for
their assertion. They next say that the incorporation was
invalid for failure to show the oath of incorporators as
required by Sec. 16-2-6, U.C.A. 1953, and refer to Ex. 9.
Respondents submit that the oath of incorporators attached
to the Articles of Incorporation signed by Edward F. Nisson, Marion Jolley and Israel Nielson on February 2, 1965,
and sworn to before a notary public, is fully adequate to
comply with the statute. Respondents further submit that
none of the appellants is in a position to attack the validity
of the incorporation of the new company.
Under Point 7, appellants assert that in Civil No. 2508,
it was mandatory that all individuals owning rights in Mill
Creek be made defendants. They cite no authority for the
statement, and respondents submit that this court has heretofore held that failure to join all owners of interests in
property attempted to be condemned is no ground for motion for dismissal by parties who are named as defendants.
Brigham City v. Chase, 30 Utah 410, 85 Pac. 436.
As to appellants' Point 8, asserting that the State Engineer erred in failing to approve Application No. 29676 filed
by Washington City to appropriate 3.00 c.f.s. of the waters
of Mill Creek, and the application of Adams, Jolley and
Kirkland to change the point of diversion of 2.57 c.f.s. of
such waters, appellants infer that they were the sole users
of the waters of Mill Creek "which had been abandoned
prior to 1953, and were also virtually the sole users of the
remainder after 1953" - but follow this with the statement that "with such scant evidence before the trial coutl
it was obviously impossible to determine precisely who had
utilized the subject waters during the years 1923 to 1957."
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As we understand appellants' position on Application
No. 29676, they contend that somewhere along the line
there has been a forfeiture of some of the water awarded
to the Mill Creek vVater Company under the Virgin River
Decree. It is this quantity of water which they are apparrntly seeking to appropriate under this application. Without conceding that there has been a forfeiture of any water
by the Mill Creek Water Company, we submit that appellants' position is unsound as a matter of law. Under Utah
law, water which is forfeited reverts to the public, but this
does not mean it is available for appropriation. Existing
rights on the source are entitled to the distribution of this
increased supply until these rights are satisfied.
"Even though title were to revert to the public, it is unlikely that it would be available for appropriation by
filing with the State Engineer for on practically every
stream in this state there are junior appropriators
vvhose applications have been approved by the State
Engineer for a total of more water than ordinarily is
available in the stream. The reversion of this water
would then go to feed these rights of the junior appropriator." Wellsville East Field Irr. Co. v. Lindsay
Land & Livestock Co., 104 Utah 448, 137 Pac. 2d 634
( 1943).
Therefore, we submit that appellants are not entitled to
ha\·e this application approved.
Appellants' Point 9 is entirely moot at this time, because
Trmporary Change Application No. 59-5 expired by its
mrn tfTms on April 30, 1960. See paragraph 15 of Exhibit
3, \\ hich states, "The change will be made from April 30,
19.19, to April 30, 1960." One year is the maximum period
~or \\hich a temporary change may be approved. Section
!3-3-3, lJ.C.A. 1953, provides, "Temporary changes in-
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elude and are limited to all changes for definitely fixed
periods of not exceeding one year." Any review of the
State Engineer's decision approving this change would have
had to been made within sixty days of his decision of April
30, 1959, Sections 73-3-3 and 14, U.C.A. 1953. Further,
the complaint in Civil No. 3036 does not even purport to
appeal the Engineer's decision on this application.
Respondents again assert that it was not the duty of the
State Engineer to try title to rights in Mill Creek water, and
it is not the duty of the trial court or of the appellate court
in an action to review the State Engineer's decision, to try
such question. If appellants are damaged by the action of
St. George City in procuring the order for temporary possession of waters to which they were entitled, let them come
in and prove their damage. So too, if they object to or claim
damages for final condemnation of the waters sought to be
condemned, let them come in and prove their ownership
and have their damages assessed. The burden of proof is
upon them. Tanner v. Provo Bench Canal Co., 40 Utah
105, 121 Pac. 584, 589; 18 Am. Jur. 985, Sec. 342. Their
motions for dismissal of the cases herein involved were obviously not well taken, and their appeal from the summary
judgment denying their motions is without any merit whatsoever.
Under Point 10, appellants assert that the State Engi·
neer properly granted applications a-3592 and a-3593 filed
by Washington City to change points of diversion for 0.38
c.f.s. of water in Mill Creek owned by Washington City.
Why, then, did appellants in their petition herein include
a prayer for review of these decisions of the State Engineer?
Under the same point, appellants assert that, since the order
of occupancy, St. George has continued to utilize the entire
flow of Mill Creek, and has blatantly ignored the rights of
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Washington City and of the other appellants, and that this
court sh~uld remand the case and "direct the trial court to
enter a decree mforcing the rights of Washington City and
restraining St. George from further interference therewith." This illustrates the misconception in appellants'
thinking regarding the nature of these cases and the powers
of the court in an action to review a <lecision of the State
Engineer.
Point 11 and appellants' concluding paragraph are repetitious of matters urged in other parts of appellants' brief.
and respondents submit are fully answered herein.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, these respondents submit:

1. That none of the appellants' motions for summary
judgment in these cases was well taken, and the summary
judgment of the trial court denying such motions was correct and proper.

2. That the finding of the trial court that the new Mill
Creek Water Company had succeeded to ownership of
water rights in Sand Hollow or Mill Creek formerly decreed
to the old Mill Creek Water Company was correct and
~ho1ild bf'. approved by this court.

'3. That the trial court did not err in issuing its order for
temporary occupancy and possession in Civil Case No.
!108 or in Civil Case No. 2940.

4. That the i\1ill Creek Water Company, incorporated
Fehn1an 8, 1957, is a proper party defendant in Civil Case
l\'o 2:i08 and is a proper party plaintiff in Civil Case No.
2CJ't0
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5. That Civil Cases Nos. 2508 and 2940 should be remanded for trial of issues as to damages.
6. That Civil Case No. 3036 should be remanded with
directions to dismiss appellants' petitions, with costs to respondents, including costs on appeal.
Respectfully submitted,
CHARLES M. PICKETT
St. George, Utah
Attorney for St. George City and
Mill Creek Water Company

PHIL L. HANSEN
Attorney General
DALLIN W. JENSEN
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for State Engineer

